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It may be fun to perceive illusions, but the understanding of how they work is even
more stimulating and sustainable: They can tell us where the limits and capacity of
our perceptual apparatus are found—they can specify how the constraints of perception
are set. Furthermore, they let us analyze the cognitive sub-processes underlying our
perception. Illusions in a scientific context are not mainly created to reveal the failures of
our perception or the dysfunctions of our apparatus, but instead point to the specific power
of human perception. The main task of human perception is to amplify and strengthen
sensory inputs to be able to perceive, orientate and act very quickly, specifically and
efficiently. The present paper strengthens this line of argument, strongly put forth by
perceptual pioneer Richard L. Gregory (e.g., Gregory, 2009), by discussing specific visual
illusions and how they can help us to understand the magic of perception.
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ABOUT THE VERIDICALITY OF PERCEPTION
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REALITY AND OBJECT
Sensory perception is often the most striking proof of something
factual—when we perceive something, we interpret it and take
it as “objective”, “real”. Most obviously, you can experience this
with eyewitness testimonies: If an eyewitness has “seen it with the
naked eye”, judges, jury members and attendees take the reports
of these percepts not only as strong evidence, but usually as fact—
despite the active and biasing processes on basis of perception and
memory. Indeed, it seems that there is no better, no more “proof ”
of something being factual knowledge than having perceived
it. The assumed link between perception and physical reality is
particularly strong for the visual sense—in fact, we scrutinize it
only when sight conditions have been unfortunate, when people
have bad vision or when we know that the eyewitness was under
stress or was lacking in cognitive faculties. When people need even
more proof of reality than via the naked eye, they intuitively try
to touch the to-be-analyzed entity (if at all possible) in order to
investigate it haptically. Feeling something by touch seems to be
the ultimate perceptual experience in order for humans to speak
of physical proof (Carbon and Jakesch, 2013).
We can analyze the quality of our perceptual experiences by
standard methodological criteria. By doing so we can regularly
find out that our perception is indeed mostly very reliable and also
objective (Gregory and Gombrich, 1973)—but only if we employ
standard definitions of “objective” as being consensual among
different beholders. Still, even by meeting these methodological
criteria, we cannot give something in evidence about physical
reality. It seems that knowledge about the physical properties of
objects cannot be gained by perception, so perception is neither
“veridical” nor “valid” in the strict sense of the words—the
properties of the “thing in itself ” remain indeterminate in any
empirical sense (Kant, 1787/1998). We “reliably” and “objec-
tively” might perceive the sun going up in the morning and down
in the evening; the physical relations are definitely different, as
we have known at least since Nicolaus Copernicus’s proposed
heliocentricism—it might also be common sense that the Earth
is a spheroid for most people, still the majority of people have
neither perceived the Earth as spherical nor represented it like
that; one reason for this is that in everyday life contexts the illusion
of a plane works perfectly well to guide us in the planning and
execution of our actions (Carbon, 2010b).
LIMITATIONS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF OBJECTIVE PERCEPTION
The limitations of perception are even more far reaching: our
perception is not only limited when we do not have access to
the thing in itself, it is very practically limited to the quality of
processing and the general specifications of our perceptual system.
For instance, our acoustic sense can only register and process
a very narrow band of frequencies ranging from about 16 Hz–
20 kHz as a young adult—this band gets narrower and narrower
with increasing age. Typically, infrasonic and ultrasonic bands
are just not perceivable despite being essential for other species
such as elephants and bats, respectively. The perception of the
environment and, consequently, the perception and representa-
tion of the world as such, is different for these species—what
would be the favorite music of an elephant, which preference
would a bat indicate if “honestly asked”? What does infrasonic
acoustics sound and feel like? Note: infrasonic frequencies can
also be perceived by humans; not acoustically in a strict sense
but via vibrations—still, the resulting experiences are very dif-
ferent (cf. Nagel, 1974). To make such information accessible we
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FIGURE 1 | Demonstration of the blind spot, the area on the retina
where visual information cannot be processed due to a lack of
photoreceptors. The demonstration works as follows: Fixate at a distance
of approx. 40 cm the X on the left side with your right eye while having
closed your left eye—now move your head slightly in a horizontal way from
left to right and backwards till the black disc on the right side seems to
vanish.
need transformation techniques; for instance, a Geiger-Müller
tube for making ionizing radiation perceivable as we have not
developed any sensory system for detecting and feeling this band
of extremely high frequency electromagnetic radiation.
But even if we have access to given information from the
environmental world, it would be an illusion to think of “objective
perception” of it—differences in perception across different indi-
viduals seem to be obvious: this is one reason for different persons
having different tastes, but it is even more extreme: even within
a lifetime of one person, the perceptual qualities and quantities
which we can process change. Elderly people, for instance, often
have yellowish corneas yielding biased color perception reducing
the ability to detect and differentiate bluish color spectra. So even
objectivity of perceptions in the sense of consensual experience
is hardly achievable, even within one species, even within one
individual—just think of fashion phenomena (Carbon, 2011a), of
changes in taste (Martindale, 1990) or the so-called cycle of pref-
erences (Carbon, 2010a)! Clearly, so-called objective perception is
impossible, it is an illusion.
ILLUSORY CONSTRUCTION OF THE WORLD
The problem with the idea of veridical perception of the world
is further intensified when taking additional perceptual phe-
nomena, which demonstrate highly constructive qualities of our
perceptual system, into account. A very prominent example of
this kind is the perceptual effect which arises when any visual
information which we want to process falls on the area of the
retina where the so-called blind spot is located (see Figure 1).
Interestingly, visual information that is mapped on the blind
spot is not just dropped—this would be the easiest solution
for the visual apparatus. It is also not rigidly interpolated, for
instance, by just doubling neighbor information, but intelligently
complemented by analysing the meaning and Gestalt of the
context. If we, for example, are exposed to a couple of lines, the
perceptual system would complement the physically non-existing
information of the blind spot by a best guess heuristic how the
lines are interconnected in each case, mostly yielding a very close
approximation to “reality” as it uses most probable solutions.
Finally, we experience clear visual information, seemingly in the
same quality as the one which mirrors physical perception—in the
end, the “physical perception” and the “constructed perception”,
are of the same quality, also because the “physical perception”
is neither a depiction of physical reality, but is also constructed
by top-down processes based on best guess heuristic as a kind of
hypothesis testing or problem solving (Gregory, 1970).
Beside this prominent example which has become common
knowledge up to now, a series of further phenomena exist where
we can speak of full perceptual constructions of the world outside
without any direct link to the physical realities. A very intrigu-
ing example of this kind will be described in more detail in
the following: When we make fast eye movements (so-called
saccades) our perceptual system is suppressed, with the result
that we are functionally blind during such saccades. Actually, we
do not perceive these blind moments of life although they are
highly frequent and relatively long as such—actually, Rayner et
al. estimated that typical fixations last about 200–250 ms and
saccades last about 20–40 ms (Rayner et al., 2001), so about 10%
of our time when we are awake is susceptible to such suppression
effects. In accordance with other filling-in phenomena, missing
data is filled up with the most plausible information: Such a
process needs hypotheses about what is going on in the current
situation and how the situation will evolve (Gregory, 1970, 1990).
If the hypotheses are misleading because the underlying mental
model of the situation and its further genesis is incorrect, we face
an essential problem: what we then perceive (or fail to perceive)
is incompatible with the current situation, and so will mislead
our upcoming action. In most extreme cases, this could lead to
fatal decisions: for instance: if the model does not construct a
specific interfering object in our movement axis, we might miss
information essential to changing our current trajectory resulting
in a collision course. In such a constellation, we would be totally
startled by the crash, as we would not have perceived the target
object at all—this is not about missing an object but about entirely
overlooking it due to a non-existing trace of perception.
Despite the knowledge about these characteristics of the visual
system, we might doubt such processes as the mechanisms are
working to so great an extent in most everyday life situations that
it provides the perfect illusion of continuous, correct and super-
detailed visual input. We can, however, illustrate this mechanism
very easily by just observing our eye movements in a mirror:
when executing fast eye movements, we cannot observe them by
directly inspecting our face in the mirror—we can only perceive
our fixations and the slow movements of the eyes. If we, however,
film the same scene with a video camera, the whole procedure
looks totally different: Now we clearly also see the fast movements;
so we can directly experience the specific operation of the visual
system in this respect by comparing the same scene captured by
two differently working visual systems: our own, very cognitively
operating, visual system and the rigidly filming video system
which just catches the scene frame by frame without further
processing, interpreting and tuning it.1 We call this moment of
temporary functional blindness phenomenon “saccade blindness”
1There is an interesting update in technology for demonstrating this effect
putting forward by one of the reviewers. If you use the 2nd camera of your
smartphone (the one for shooting “selfies”) or your notebook camera and
you look at your depicted eyes very closely, then the delay of building up the
film sequence is seemingly a bit longer than the saccadic suppression yielding
the interesting effect of perceiving your own eye movements directly. Note:
I have tried it out and it worked, by the way best when using older models
which might take longer for building up the images. You will perceive your
eye movements particular clearly when executing relatively large saccades, e.g.,
from the left periphery to the right and back.
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FIGURE 2 | Demonstration of top-down processing when reading the
statement “The Grand Illussion” under highly challenging conditions
(at least challenging for automatic character recognition).
or “saccade suppression”, which again illustrates the illusionary
aspects of human perception “saccadic suppression”, Bridgeman
et al., 1975; “tactile suppression”, Ziat et al., 2010). We can utilize
this phenomena for testing interesting hypotheses on the mental
representation of the visual environment: if we change details of
a visual display during such functional blind phases of saccadic
movements, people usually do not become aware of such changes,
even if very important details, e.g., the expression of the mouth,
are changed (Bohrn et al., 2010).
ILLUSIONS BY TOP-DOWN-PROCESSES
Gregory proposed that perception shows the quality of hypothesis
testing and that illusions make us clear how these hypotheses are
formulated and on which data they are based (Gregory, 1970).
One of the key assumptions for hypothesis testing is that percep-
tion is a constructive process depending on top-down process-
ing. Such top-down processes can be guided through knowledge
gained over the years, but perception can also be guided by pre-
formed capabilities of binding and interpreting specific forms as
certain Gestalts. The strong reliance of perception on top-down
processing is the essential key for assuring reliable perceptual abil-
ities in a world full of ambiguity and incompleteness. If we read a
text from an old facsimile where some of the letters have vanished
or bleached out over the years, where coffee stains have covered
partial information and where decay processes have turned the
originally white paper into a yellowish crumbly substance, we
might be very successful in reading the fragments of the text,
because our perceptual system interpolates and (re-)constructs
(see Figure 2). If we know or understand the general meaning of
the target text, we will even read over some passages that do not
exist at all: we fill the gaps through our knowledge—we change
the meaning towards what we expect.
A famous example which is often cited and shown in this realm
is the so-called man-rat-illusion where an ambiguous sketch
drawing is presented whose content is not clearly decipherable,
but switches from showing a man to showing a rat—another
popular example of this kind is the bistable picture where the
interpretation flips from an old woman to a young woman an
FIGURE 3 | The young-old-woman illusion (also known as the My Wife
and My Mother-In-Law illusion) already popular in Germany in the 19th
century when having been frequently depicted on postcards. Boring
(1930) was the first who presented this illusion in a scientific context
(image on the right) calling it a “new” illusion (concretely, “a new
ambiguous figure”) although it was very probably taken from an already
displayed image of the 19th century within an A and P Condensed Milk
advertisement (Lingelbach, 2014).
v.v. (see Figure 3)—most people interpret this example as a fas-
cinating illusion demonstrating humans’ capability of switching
from one meaning to another, but the example also demonstrates
an even more intriguing process: what we will perceive at first
glance is mainly guided through the specific activation of our
semantic network. If we have been exposed to a picture of a man
before, or if we think of a man or have heard the word “man”, the
chance is strongly increased that our perceptual system interprets
the ambiguous pattern towards a depiction of a man—if the prior
experiences were more associated with a rat, a mouse or another
animal of such a kind, we will, in contrast, tend to interpret the
ambiguous pattern more as a rat.
So, we can literally say that we perceive what we know—
if we have no prior knowledge of certain things we can even
overlook important details in a pattern because we have no strong
association with something meaningful. The intimate processing
between sensory inputs and our semantic networks enables us to
recognize familiar objects within a few milliseconds, even if they
show the complexity of human faces (Locher et al., 1993; Willis
and Todorov, 2006; Carbon, 2011b).
Top-down processes are powerful in schematizing and easing-
up perceptual processes in the sense of compressing the “big
data” of the sensory inputs towards tiny data packages with
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pre-categorized labels on such schematized “icons” (Carbon,
2008). Top-down processes, however, are also susceptible to char-
acteristic fallacies or illusions due to their guided, model-based
nature: When we have only a brief time slot for a snapshot of
a complex scene, the scene is (if we have associations with the
general meaning of the inspected scene at all) so simplified that
specific details get lost in favor of the processing and interpreta-
tion of the general meaning of the whole scene.
Biederman (1981) impressively demonstrated this by exposing
participants to a sketch drawing of a typical street scene where
typical objects are placed in a prototypical setting, with the excep-
tion that a visible hydrant in the foreground was not positioned
on the pavement besides a car but unusually directly on the car.
When people were exposed to such a scene for only 150 ms,
followed by a scrambled backward mask, they “re-arranged”
the setting by top-down processes based on their knowledge of
hydrants and their typical positions on pavements. In this specific
case, people have indeed been deceived, because they report a
scene which was in accordance with their knowledge but not
with the assessment of the presented scene—but for everyday
actions this seems unproblematic. Although you might indeed
lose the link to the fine-detailed structure of a specific entity
when strongly relying on top-down processes, such an endeavor
works quite brilliantly in most cases as it is a best guess estima-
tion or approximation—it works particularly well when we are
running out of resources, e.g., when we are in a specific mode
of being pressed for time and/or you are engaged in a series of
other cognitive processes. Actually, such a mode is the standard
mode in everyday life. However, even if we had the time and no
other processes needed to be executed, we would not be able to
adequately process the big data of the sensory input.
The whole idea of this top-down processing with schematized
perception stems from F. C. Bartlett’s pioneering series of exper-
iments in a variety of domains (Bartlett, 1932). Bartlett already
showed that we do not read the full information from a visual
display or a narrative, but that we rely on schemata reflecting the
essence of things, stories, and situations being strongly shaped
by prior knowledge and its specific activation (see for a critical
reflection of Bartlett’s method Carbon and Albrecht, 2012).
PERCEPTION AS A GRAND ILLUSION
RECONSTRUCTING HUMAN PSYCHOLOGICAL REALITY
There is clearly an enormous gap between the big data provided
by the external world and our strictly limited capacity to process
them. The gap widens even further when taking into account
that we not only have to process the data but ultimately have
to make clear sense of the core of the given situation. The goal
is to make one (and only one) decision based on the unam-
biguous interpretation of this situation in order to execute an
appropriate action. This very teleological way of processing needs
inhibitory capabilities for competing interpretations to strictly
favor one single interpretation which enables fast action without
quarrelling about alternatives. In order to realize such a clear
interpretation of a situation, we need a mental model of the
external world which is very clear and without ambiguities and
indeterminacies. Ideally, such a model is a kind of caricature of
physical reality: If there is an object to be quickly detected, the
FIGURE 4 | Demonstration of the simultaneous contrast, an optical
illusion already described as phenomenon 200 years ago by Johan
Wolfgang von Goethe and provided in high quality and with an
intense effect by McCourt (1982): the inner horizontal bar is physically
filled with the same gray value all over, nevertheless, the periphery
with its continuous change of gray from darker to lighter values from
left to right induce the perception of a reverse continuous change of
gray values. The first one who showed the effect in a staircase of grades
of gray was probably Ewald Hering (see Hering, 1907, pp. I. Teil, XII. Kap.
Tafel II), who also proposed the theory of opponent color processing.
figure-ground contrast, e.g., should be intensified. If we need
to identify the borders of an object under unfavorable viewing
conditions, it is helpful to enhance the transitions from one
border to another, for instance. If we want to easily diagnose the
ripeness of a fruit desired for eating, it is most helpful when color
saturation is amplified for familiar kinds of fruits. Our perceptual
system has exactly such capabilities of intensifying, enhancing and
amplifying—the result is the generation of schematic, prototyp-
ical, sketch-like perceptions and representations. Any metaphor
for perception as a kind of tool which makes photos is fully
misleading because perception is much more than blueprinting:
it is a cognitive process aiming at reconstructing any scene at its
core.
All these “intelligent perceptual processes” can most easily be
demonstrated by perceptual illusions: For instance, when we look
at the inner horizontal bar of Figure 4, we observe a continuous
shift from light to dark gray and from left to right, although there
is no physical change in the gray value—in fact only one gray
value is used for creating this region. The illusion is induced by
the distribution of the peripheral gray values which indeed show
a continuous shift of gray levels, although in a reverse direction.
The phenomenon of simultaneous contrast helps us to make the
contrast clearer; helping us to identify figure-ground relations
more easily, more quickly and more securely.
A similar principle of intensifying given physical relations by
the perceptual system is now known as the Chevreul-Mach bands
(see Figure 5), independently introduced by chemist Michel
Eugène Chevreul (see Chevreul, 1839) and by physicist and
philosopher Ernst Waldfried Josef Wenzel Mach (Mach, 1865).
Via the process of lateral inhibition, luminance changes from one
bar to another are exaggerated, specifically at the edges of the
bars. This helps to differentiate between the different areas and
to trigger edge-detection of the bars.
CONSTRUCTING HUMAN PSYCHOLOGICAL REALITY
This reconstructive capability is impressive and helps us to get
rid of ambiguous or indeterminate percepts. However, the power
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FIGURE 5 | Chevreul-Mach bands. Demonstration of contrast
exaggeration by lateral inhibition: although every bar is filled with one solid
level of gray, we perceive narrow bands at the edges with increased
contrast which does not reflect the physical reality of solid gray bars.
FIGURE 6 | Demonstration of illusory contours which create the clear
perception of Gestalts. The so-called Kanizsa triangle named after
Gaetano Kanizsa (see Kanizsa, 1955), a very famous example of the long
tradition of such figures displayed over centuries in architecture, fashion and
ornamentation. We not only perceive two triangles, but even interpret the
whole configuration as one with clear depth, with the solid white “triangle”
in the foreground of another “triangle” which stands bottom up.
of perception is even more intriguing when we look at a related
phenomenon. When we analyze perceptual illusions where enti-
ties or relations are not only enhanced in their recognizability but
even entirely constructed without a physical correspondence, then
we can quite rightly speak of the “active construction” of human
psychological reality. A very prominent example is the Kanizsa
triangle (Figure 6) where we clearly perceive illusory contours and
related Gestalts—actually, none of them exists at all in a physical
sense. The illusion is so strong that we have the feeling of being
able to grasp even the whole configuration.
To detect and recognize such Gestalts is very important for
us. Fortunately, we are not only equipped with a cognitive
mechanism helping us to perceive such Gestalts, but we also
feel rewarded when having recognized them as Gestalts despite
indeterminate patterns (Muth et al., 2013): in the moment of
the insight for a Gestalt the now determinate pattern gains liking
(the so-called “Aesthetic-Aha-effect”, Muth and Carbon, 2013).
The detection and recognition process adds affective value to
the pattern which leads to the activation of even more cognitive
energy to deal with it as it now means something to us.
CONCLUSIONS
Perceptual illusions can be seen, interpreted and used in two
very different aspects: on the one hand, and this is the common
property assigned to illusions, they are used to entertain people.
They are a part of our everyday culture, they can kill time. On
the other hand, they are often the starting point for creating
insights. And insights, especially if they are based on personal
experiences through elaborative processes actively, are perfect
pre-conditions to increase understanding and to improve and
optimize mental models (Carbon, 2010b). We can even combine
both aspects to create an attractive learning context: by drawing
people’s attention via arousing and playful illusions, we generate
attraction towards the phenomena underlying the illusions. If
people get really interested, they will also invest sufficient time and
cognitive energy to be able to solve an illusion or to get an idea of
how the illusion works. If they arrive at a higher state of insight,
they will benefit from understanding what kind of perceptual
mechanism is underlying the phenomenon.
We can of course interpret perceptual illusions as malfunc-
tions indicating the typical limits of our perceptual or cognitive
system—this is probably the standard perspective on the whole
area of illusions. In this view, our systems are fallible, slow,
malfunctioning, and imperfect. We can, however, also interpret
illusory perceptions as a sign of our incredible, highly complex
and efficient capabilities of transforming sensory inputs into
understanding and interpreting the current situation in a very
fast way in order to generate adequate and goal-leading actions in
good time (see Gregory, 2009)—this view is not yet the standard
one to be found in beginners’ text books and typical descriptions
or non-scientific papers on illusions. By taking into account how
perfectly we act in most everyday situations, we can experience
the high “intelligence” of the perceptual system quite easily and
intuitively. We might not own the most perfect system when we
aim to reproduce the very details of a scene, but we can assess the
core meaning of a complex scene.
Typical perceptual processes work so brilliantly that we can
mostly act appropriately, and, very important for a biological
system, we can act in response to the sensory inputs very fast—
this has to be challenged by any technical, man-made system,
and will always be the most important benchmark for artifi-
cial perceptual systems. Following the research and engineering
program of bionics (Xie, 2012),where systems and processes of
nature are transferred to technical products, we might be well-
advised to orient our developments in the field of perception to
the characteristic processing of biological perceptual systems, and
their typical behavior when perceptual illusions are encountered.
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